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Abstract
We consider the three-dimensional stable matching problem with
cyclic preferences, a problem originally proposed by Knuth. Despite
extensive study of the problem by experts from different areas, the
question of whether every instance of this problem admits a stable
matching remains unanswered. In 2004, Boros, Gurvich, Jaslar and
Krasner showed that a stable matching always exists when the number
of agents in each of the groups is three. In 2006, Eriksson, Sjo¨strand
and Strimling showed that a stable matching exists also when the num-
ber of agents in each group is four. In this paper, we demonstrate that
a stable matching exists when each group has five agents. Further-
more, we show that there are at least two distinct stable matchings in
that setting.
1 Introduction
The stable matching problem is one of the most important problems in
algorithmic game theory. In the stable matching problem, we are given two
disjoint sets of agents, where each agent in one set has a preference order
over agents in the other set. We are interested in finding a matching of
agents, i.e. we are interested in pairing some agents from the first set with
some agent from another set. Moreover, we want the resulting matching
to be stable, i.e. there should exist no two agents which prefer each other
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to their assigned partners. In their seminal paper, Gale and Shapley [8]
show that a stable matching always exists and they provide an algorithm
for finding a stable matching in polynomial running time.
The situations changes when we have three disjoint groups of agents,
where the agents in the first, second and third groups have a preference
order over the agents in the second, third and first groups, respectively.
In an instance of the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic
preferences (c3DSM), we have three disjoint sets of agents A, B and C such
that |A| = |B| = |C| = n. Each agent a in the set A has a total order of
the agents in B according to the preference of a. Thus, given a ∈ A and
b, b′ ∈ B we can compare the agents b and b′ according to the preference
of a. For the sake of exposition, we use the notation b >a b
′ to say that a
prefers b to b′. Similarly, each agent b in the set B has a total order of the
agents in C; and each agent c in the set C has a total order of the agents
in A.
A (perfect) matching M is a set of n triples of the form (a, b, c), a ∈ A,
b ∈ B and c ∈ C. Given a matching M , for all a ∈ A we denote by M(a)
the agent b ∈ B such that M contains a triple of the form (a, b, c) for some
c ∈ C. Similarly, for b ∈ B we denote by M(b) the agent c ∈ C such that
M contains a triple of the form (a, b, c) for some a ∈ A; for c ∈ C we denote
by M(c) the agent a ∈ A such that M contains a triple of the form (a, b, c)
for some b ∈ B.
A triple (a, b, c), a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C is called blocking for a matching M
if
b >a M(a) and c >b M(b) and a >c M(c) .
A matching M is called stable if there exists no blocking triple for M . The
following conjecture generalizes the results of Gale and Shapley [8] and is
usually attributed to Knuth.
Conjecture 1. Every instance of (c3DSM) admits a stable matching.
Eriksson, Sjo¨strand and Strimling further strengthened Conjecture 1 as
follows.
Conjecture 2. Every instance of (c3DSM) admits at least two distinct
stable matchings.
1.1 Previous Work
The study of the generalization of the stable matching problem to three
groups was initiated by Knuth [9] (Problem 11, page 97):
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Peut-on ge´ne´raliser le proble`me du couplage stable a` trois ensem-
bles d’objects (par example hommes, femmes, chiens)?
The introduction of cyclic (or “circular”) preferences (c3DSM), was at-
tributed to Knuth by one anonymous referee in the paper of Ng and Hirschberg [10]
on three-dimensional stable matching problems:
One of the referees, who called our attention to this problem,
attributes its origin to Knuth and “dubbed” it circular 3GSM.
The complexity of this problem is currently an open question.
In 2004, Boros, Gurvich, Jaslar and Krasner showed that every instance
of (c3DSM) with n = 3 admits a stable matching [4]. In 2006, Eriksson,
Sjo¨strand and Strimling showed that a stable matching always exists also
when n = 4 [6]. The approach of Eriksson, Sjo¨strand and Strimling is
based on a strengthening of the result for n = 3 and then exploiting this
strengthening to show that Conjecture 1 (and 2) can be answered positively
for n ≤ 4.
Biro´ and McDermid showed that for the variant of the problem in which
some agents are not acceptable for some agents of the previous group, a
stable matching might not exist [3]. Moreover, in this case the decision
problem about the existence of a stable matching becomes NP-complete [3].
Farczadi, Georgiou, and Ko¨nemann showed that it is NP-complete to decide
whether a given partial matching consisting of pairs (a, b), a ∈ A, b ∈ B can
be extended to a stable matching consisting of triples (a, b, c), a ∈ A, b ∈ B
and c ∈ C [7].
1.2 Our Results
In this paper, we follow the natural approach and formulate the verification
of Conjecture 1 (then 2) as a satisfiability problem, obtaining the following
theorems.
Theorem 3. For n = 5 every instance of (c3DSM) admits a stable match-
ing.
Theorem 4. For n = 5 every instance of (c3DSM) admits at least two
distinct stable matchings.
We would like to remark that a naive inspection approach does not turn
out to be fruitful for this problem. This is due to the large number of
instances of (c3DSM). For example, for n = 5, the number of (labeled)
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instances of (c3DSM) is (5!)15 ≈ 1.54 ·1031 . After the elimination of symme-
tries, we still have at least (5!)12/3 ≈ 2.97·1024 possible instances. For n = 6
these numbers look as follows: (6!)18 ≈ 2.7 · 1051 and (6!)15/3 ≈ 2.42 · 1042,
explaining why it is hard to verify Conjecture 1 using a naive inspection
approach.
2 Our Approach
To prove that Conjecture 1 can be answered positively for n = 5, we formu-
late a satisfiability problem such that there exists an instance of (c3DSM)
with no stable matching if and only if the constructed formula is satisfiable.
For a ∈ A, b, b′ ∈ B, b 6= b′, we let the variable xa,b,b′ indicate the
preference of a between b and b′. Specifically, xa,b,b′ is assigned True if a
prefers b to b′, i.e., b >a b
′, and False otherwise. It follows that xa,b,b′ =
¬xa,b′,b. In our formulation of the satisfiability problem, we use only one
of the variables {xa,b,b′ , xa,b′,b} as an explicit variable while the other is
implicitly defined as its negation. However, as a notation, we still use both
xa,b,b′ and xa,b′,b in the following exposition, for the sake of simplicity. We
define similarly the variables xb,c,c′ for b ∈ B, c, c
′ ∈ C, c 6= c′ and the
variables xc,a,a′ for c ∈ C, a, a
′ ∈ A, a 6= a′.
Next, we construct a formula (F) such that there exists an instance of
(c3DSM) with no stable matching if and only if there exists a value for x sat-
isfying (F). Our formula (F) is a conjunction of three formulas (Ford), (Fz)
and (Fstab). The first formula (Ford) captures the requirement that each
agent in A (resp. B, C) has a total order of agents in B (resp. C, A). This
is modeled by the following statements
xa,b,b′ ∧ xa,b′,b′′ =⇒ xa,b,b′′ , ∀ a ∈ A, b,b
′, b′′ ∈ B, b 6= b′ 6= b′′ 6= b,
xb,c,c′ ∧ xb,c′,c′′ =⇒ xb,c,c′′, ∀ b ∈ B, c,c
′, c′′ ∈ C, c 6= c′ 6= c′′ 6= c,
xc,a,a′ ∧ xc,a′,a′′ =⇒ xc,a,a′′ , ∀ c ∈ C, a,a
′,a′′ ∈ A, a 6= a′ 6= a′′ 6= a,
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which can be written in conjunctive normal form (CNF) as
∧
a∈A
b,b′,b′′∈B
b6=b′ 6=b′′ 6=b
(¬xa,b,b′ ∨ ¬xa,b′,b′′ ∨ xa,b,b′′)
∧
∧
b∈B
c,c′,c′′∈C
c 6=c′ 6=c′′ 6=c
(¬xb,c,c′ ∨ ¬xb,c′,c′′ ∨ xb,c,c′′) (Ford)
∧
∧
c∈C
a,a′,a′′∈A
a6=a′ 6=a′′ 6=a
(¬xc,a,a′ ∨ ¬xc,a′,a′′ ∨ xc,a,a′′).
Observe that a value of x satisfies (Ford) if and only if it corresponds to an
instance of (c3DSM).
Next, let us denote by M the set of all possible matchings, and by
B(M) the set of potential blocking triples for a given matching M ∈ M,
i.e., B(M) := {(a, b, c) ∈ A × B × C : b 6= M(a), c 6= M(b), a 6= M(c)}.
In the second formula (Fz), we introduce auxiliary variables zM,a,b,c, for all
M ∈ M and (a, b, c) ∈ B(M). Each variable zM,a,b,c can be True only if the
triple (a, b, c) is blocking for the matching M , i.e.,
zM,a,b,c =⇒ xa,b,M(a) ∧ xb,c,M(b) ∧ xc,a,M(a),
which is equivalent to
∧
M∈M
(a,b,c)∈B(M)
(¬zM,a,b,c∨xa,b,M(a))∧(¬zM,a,b,c∨xb,c,M(b))∧(¬zM,a,b,c∨xc,a,M(a)).
(Fz)
Finally, we define the third formula (Fstab) as follows:
∧
M∈M
∨
(a,b,c)∈B(M)
zM,a,b,c . (Fstab)
The formula (Fstab) models the condition that, in the instance of (c3DSM)
defined by the x variables there exists a blocking triple for every matching
in M. In other words, no matching is stable for the instance of (c3DSM)
defined by the x variables.
Our resulting formula is defined as follows:
F := Ford ∧ Fz ∧ Fstab. (F)
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Note that the auxiliary z variables could be eliminated without affecting
the satisfiability of (F). Indeed, the existence of a solution for (F) implies
the existence of a solution with zM,a,b,c ⇐⇒ xa,b,M(a) ∧xb,c,M(b) ∧xc,a,M(a).
One could thus set zM,a,b,c = xa,b,M(a) ∧ xb,c,M(b) ∧ xc,a,M(a) and substitute
out the z variables. However, the introduction of z and (Fz) is one way of
putting (F) into CNF.
For Conjecture 2, we replace (Fstab) with the alternative formula (F
′
stab),
in which we associate one additional variable yM to every clause of (Fstab).
∧
M∈M

yM ∨
∨
(a,b,c)∈B(M)
zM,a,b,c

 . (F ′stab)
This models the fact that, for each matching M , if M is stable, then yM
is True. Next, we need to express that at most one of the yM variables
is True. At-most-one (AMO) constraints are a common feature in SAT
formulations, with multiple possible CNF encodings [11]. We opted for the
so-called sequential encoding of Sinz [14] for its simplicity, and we denote it
AMO(yM). We obtain
F ′ := Ford ∧ Fz ∧ F
′
stab ∧AMO(yM). (F
′)
Observe that (F) is equivalent to fixing every yM to false in (F
′), in which
case AMO(yM) becomes trivially satisfied.
3 Symmetry Reduction
Clearly, the collection of all instances of (c3DSM) possesses many symme-
tries. If we have an instance of (c3DSM) with no stable matching, then we
can construct another instance of (c3DSM) with no stable matching by per-
muting agents inside the sets A, B and C and cyclically permuting the sets
A, B and C. These symmetries can be used to fix the value of some of the
x variables, which is equivalent (after SAT preprocessing) to reducing the
size of (F). Before we exploit these symmetries, let us make the following
remark which already appeared in [6].
Remark 5. Assume that, for n ≤ k, every instance of (c3DSM) admits a
stable matching. Then, every instance of (c3DSM) has a stable matching
whenever n = k + 1 and there is a triple (a, b, c), a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C such
that
(i) b is the most preferred agent for a
6
(ii) c is the most preferred agent for b
(iii) a is the most preferred agent for c.
Proof. Let us assume that there is an instance with n = k + 1 and with a
triple of agents (a, b, c) satisfying the above condition. By the hypothesis,
the instance of (c3DSM) induced on A \ a, B \ b, C \ c admits a stable
matching M . It is straightforward to verify that M ∪ {(a, b, c)} is a stable
matching for the original instance of (c3DSM).
For the purpose of writing (F), we let A = {a1, . . . , an}, B = {b1, . . . , bn}
and C = {c1, . . . , cn}, implicitly assigning an order to the agents. Since
(c3DSM) imposes no particular order on the agents within A, B or C, we
can choose one arbitrarily. Therefore, we can fix the order of B according
to the preferences of a1 as follows:
b1 >a1 b2 >a1 · · · >a1 bn,
and fix the order of C according to the preferences of b1:
c1 >b1 c2 >b1 · · · >b1 cn.
Then, a1 has been determined above, but we can fix the order for A \ {a1}
according to the preferences of c1:
a2 >c1 · · · >c1 an.
Finally, by Remark 5 and the result of Eriksson et al. [6] for n = 4, we
know that a1 is not the most preferred agent for c1, whenever n = 5 and
the instance of (c3DSM) has no stable matching. For n = 5, we can thus
assume that
a2 >c1 a1.
4 Computation
The complete SAT model, including (F) from Section 2 and the symmetry-
breaking constraints from Section 3 for n = 5, is given by the conjunction
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of the following clauses:
xa1,bi,bj , ∀ 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
xb1,ci,cj , ∀ 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
xc1,a2,a1 ,
xc1,ai,aj , ∀ 2 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
¬xa,b,b′ ∨ ¬xa,b′,b′′ ∨ xa,b,b′′ , ∀ a ∈ A, b, b
′, b′′ ∈ B, b 6= b′ 6= b′′ 6= b,
¬xb,c,c′ ∨ ¬xb,c′,c′′ ∨ xb,c,c′′, ∀ b ∈ B, c, c
′, c′′ ∈ C, c 6= c′ 6= c′′ 6= c,
¬xc,a,a′ ∨ ¬xc,a′,a′′ ∨ xc,a,a′′ , ∀ c ∈ C, a, a
′, a′′ ∈ A, a 6= a′ 6= a′′ 6= a,
¬zM,a,b,c ∨ xa,b,M(a), ∀M ∈ M, (a, b, c) ∈ B(M),
¬zM,a,b,c ∨ xb,c,M(b), ∀M ∈ M, (a, b, c) ∈ B(M),
¬zM,a,b,c ∨ xc,a,M(a), ∀M ∈ M, (a, b, c) ∈ B(M),∨
(a,b,c)∈B(M) zM,a,b,c, ∀M ∈ M.
(F+)
The de facto standard for the input of high-performance SAT solvers is
the so-called DIMACS format. It describes a “flat” CNF formula, i.e., one
where the v variables are numbered 1 to v, and where all the clauses are
given explicitly. In order to solve a model such as (F+), it is customary
to first write it in a domain-specific language (DSL) that allows for the
use of sets, quantifiers, and multi-dimensional variable indices. Then, a
specialized tool translates it into the desired flat format. Instead, we wrote
a small C++ program [13] whose output is the desired CNF formula in the
DIMACS format. We chose this approach for two reasons. First, to the best
of our knowledge, all suitable modeling DSLs target constraint programming
solvers. However, since (F+) is a SAT problem, we can use SAT solvers,
which are less general but faster. Secondly, we use a small custom utility
library that lets us keep the model short and transparently handles the
anti-symmetric indexing of x in which xi,j,j′ = ¬xi,j′,j.
The resulting CNF formula has 864,150 variables and 2,607,327 clauses,
and it is unsatisfiable. We solved it with plingeling [2] on large com-
puter (4x Intel Xeon E5-4660v3, total 112 threads and 256GB of RAM) in
about two and a half days (129 CPU days). We confirmed our result with
glucose-syrup 4.0 [5, 1] on a desktop computer (Intel Core i3-6100 with
4 threads and 8GB of RAM) in a bit under 5 days (18 CPU days). Detailed
solver output is provided in [12].
For the stronger Conjecture 2, we have a formulation F+′ that incor-
porates the symmetry-breaking constraints from Section 3 and the AMO
encoding from (F ′). Its CNF has 892,948 variables and 2,650,522 clauses,
and it is unsatisfiable as well. We solved it with plingeling on the large
computer mentioned above in about 9 days (515 CPU days), and confirmed
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the result with glucose-syrup on the desktop computer in about 32 days
(64 CPU days).
5 Discussion
We took the straightforward approach of formulating the verification prob-
lem for Conjectures 1 and 2 as SAT problems. While simple, this method
lets us answer the questions for n = 5, which had been open for 12 years.
We note that the same method can also provide an alternative proof for
n < 5: glucose takes about 0.12 seconds to prove unsatisfiability of (F+)
for n = 4, and thus to verify Conjecture 1 for n = 4. Unfortunately, at the
moment we are far from being able to tackle n = 6, because for n = 6 our
formulation (F+) has 62,208,270 variables and 187,144,601 clauses.
We thus believe that further theoretical insights are needed in order to
reduce the size of (F+) and then solve it for n > 5. For example, one
could try to follow the approach of [6] (see Lemma 2 in [6]) and strengthen
Conjecture 1 for both n = 4 and n = 5. Namely, one can try to show that
for n = 4 and n = 5 every instance of (c3DSM) has a stable matching with
additional properties, and later use these properties to verify Conjecture 1
for n > 5 efficiently. At the moment, we do not have a strengthening of
Conjecture 1 for n > 3 or even a candidate for such a strengthening, which
could be used to implement this approach.
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